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ABSTRACT 
 
Experiments and flight tests have shown that a Head-Up Display (HUD) and a head-down, electronic moving map 
(EMM) can be enhanced with Synthetic Vision for airport surface operations.  While great success in ground operations 
was demonstrated with a HUD, the research noted that two major HUD limitations during ground operations were their 
monochrome form and limited, fixed field of regard.  A potential solution to these limitations found with HUDs may be 
emerging Head Worn Displays (HWDs).  HWDs are small, lightweight full color display devices that may be worn 
without significant encumbrance to the user.  By coupling the HWD with a head tracker, unlimited field-of-regard may 
be realized for commercial aviation applications.  In the proposed paper, the results of two ground simulation 
experiments conducted at NASA Langley are summarized.  The experiments evaluated the efficacy of head-worn 
display applications of Synthetic Vision and Enhanced Vision technology to enhance transport aircraft surface 
operations.  The two studies tested a combined six display concepts:  (1) paper charts with existing cockpit displays, (2) 
baseline consisting of existing cockpit displays including a Class III electronic flight bag display of the airport surface; 
(3) an advanced baseline that also included displayed traffic and routing information, (4) a modified version of a HUD 
and EMM display demonstrated in previous research; (5) an unlimited field-of-regard, full color, head-tracked HWD 
with a conformal 3-D synthetic vision surface view; and (6) a fully integrated HWD concept.  The fully integrated 
HWD concept is a head-tracked, color, unlimited field-of-regard concept that provides a 3-D conformal synthetic view 
of the airport surface integrated with advanced taxi route clearance, taxi precision guidance, and data-link capability.  
The results of the experiments showed that the fully integrated HWD provided greater path performance compared to 
using paper charts alone.  Further, when comparing the HWD with the HUD concept, there were no differences in path 
performance.  In addition, the HWD and HUD concepts were rated via paired-comparisons the same in terms of 
situational awareness and workload.  However, there were over twice as many taxi incursion events with the HUD than 
the HWD.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Integrated Intelligent Flight Deck Technologies (IIFDT) project, under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP), 
comprises a multi-disciplinary research effort to develop flight deck technologies that mitigate operator-, automation-, 
and environment-induced hazards.  Towards this objective, IIFDT is developing crew/vehicle interface technologies that 
reduce the risk of pilot error, improve aircraft safety for current and future civilian and military aircraft, and proactively 
overcome aircraft safety barriers that would otherwise constrain the full realization of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NGATS).  Part of this research effort involves the use of synthetic and enhanced vision systems 
and advanced display media as enabling crew-vehicle interface technologies to meet these safety challenges. 
 
The NTSB continues to have runway incursion prevention on its top six most wanted list for aviation safety.  In a 
typical year, 300 to 400 runway incursion events are reported.  These events are cause for alarm as the worst aviation 
accident in terms of fatalities occurred in 1977 when two fully loaded 747 airplanes collided on a runway at Tenerife 
airport.  Moreover, each year there are reports of close “near-miss” runway incursions that happen with sufficient 
regularity at the world’s busiest airports to pose perhaps the most significant hazard confronting aviation today.  One 
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such airport plagued with runway incursions is Chicago O’Hare International Airport (FAA identifier: ORD).  Chicago 
O’Hare is a complex airfield for surface operations and represents one of the world’s busiest and most challenging 
airports for surface operations.  The ORD airport authority has identified “hot spots” which are areas where incursions 
are likely to occur.  Ground traffic and aircraft handling are also designed so that nominal operations minimize 
incursion potential.  ORD has an Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) which is used to warn of incursions, 
but even with these protocols and technology implementations, there have been several recent close calls.  For example, 
there was a runway incursion between two Boeing 747s at O’Hare on April 1, 1999.  From the NTSB meeting on June 
13, 2000: 
“On April 1, 1999, just after 2 o'clock in the morning, Korean Air flight 36 and Air China 9018, both 
Boeing 747s, nearly collided on runway 14 Right at the Chicago O'Hare International Airport. Air 
China had just landed and was rolling out on runway 14 right when the tower controller instructed 
Korean Air to taxi into position and hold. After Air China exited the runway at taxiway T10, the tower 
controller instructed the flight to turn left on taxiway Kilo and cross runway 27 left. The tower 
controller then cleared Korean Air for takeoff. As the airplane was rolling down the runway, Air 
China deviated from its assigned taxi route and taxied on to runway 14 Right. The Korean Air captain 
saw the 747 taxiing on to the runway but it was too late to stop. Instead, Korean Air 36 lifted off 
earlier than normal and banked left to avoid striking Air China. The two aircraft, carrying 382 
people, missed colliding by about 80 feet.” 
 
The potential consequences of such runway incursions have prompted NASA to initiate research to reduce the 
increasing rate of runway incursions.  NASA has been conducting research into runway incursion prevention systems 
for a number of years with great success in demonstrating that a flight deck alerting capability has significant potential 
to reduce, if not eliminate, runway incursions in the future.  The present study was an extension of that research with the 
objective to determine whether providing an unlimited field-of-regard, color synthetic view could further enhance the 
efficacy already demonstrated in a prior system with an advanced head-down moving map display combined with a 
HUD.  In this paper, none of the display concepts had incursion alerting capability. 
1.1. Head Worn Displays (HWD) 
Advances in display devices (e.g., head-worn devices) have been studied by NASA researchers as an alternate and 
practical method for delivering SVS concepts to the cockpit1.  HWDs are small, light weight full color display devices 
that can be worn on the head without significant encumbrance (Fig. 1).  By coupling the HWD with a head tracker, 
unlimited field-of-regard can be realized.  Unlike fixed field of view (FOV) sensors, the camera position and orientation 
for Synthetic Vision can be defined via software; thus, an unlimited field-of-regard is achieved since the Synthetic 
Vision scene is viewable from any virtual camera angle.   
 
 
Figure 1.  A Synthetic Vision enhanced HWD with a head tracker has unlimited field-of-regard. 
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The advantages of the full color, Head Tracked – Head Worn Display (HT-HWD) can directly address the HUD 
limitations shown in RIPS2 and T-NASA3,4,5,6 testing.  As such, a study was conducted to determine the efficacy of a 
HT-HWD in a complex taxiing task in a fixed-based simulator.  In addition, the study was used to obtain pilot 
comments on the concept and future enhancements required for using a HT-HWD for surface operations. 
1.2. Experiment studies 
Two experimental studies were conducted to determine the efficacy of using HWDs to enhance taxi operations.  For 
both experiments, full-color HWD display concepts were evaluated in surface operations to address previously 
witnessed display technology limitations.  Previous research has shown that a HUD can significantly enhance 
situational awareness (SA) for surface operations; however, due to the HUD’s fixed field-of-regard and limited FOV, 
intuitively portraying turns on the HUD can be difficult4.  Further, information clutter is a driving constraint for the 
monochromatic HUD.   
1.3. Simulation facility 
Both studies were conducted in the Research Flight Deck (RFD) simulator at NASA LaRC.  The RFD is a stationary, 
dual-pilot simulator consisting of a collimated 200-degree out-the-window visual.  The RFD is equipped with a 30o H x 
24o V HUD on the captain’s side.  The HWD, worn only by the captain, was an 800H x 600V pixel, full color display 
with see-through capability, 60 Hz refresh and a pilot selectable brightness knob.  The subject pilots placed the HWD 
over the right eye so that it was visible by glancing up, and therefore, subject pilots maintained unimpeded stereoscopic 
vision for out-the-window monitoring.  An optical head tracker provided the head orientation data.  The RFD has 8 Size 
D (6.4 inch square viewable area) head-down displays:  captain and first officer primary flight displays (PFD) and 
navigation displays (ND), two engine displays on the center aisle and two outboard auxiliary displays.  For both 
experiments, the first officer’s outboard auxiliary display was used as a repeater display of the captain’s head-up 
display.  The pilot controls were a tiller, throttles, rudder pedals (nose wheel steering) and differential toe brakes.  The 
simulated aircraft for both experiments was a Boeing 757. 
2. EXPERIMENT ONE:  TAXI OPERATIONS WITH ADVANCED DISPLAY 
2.1. Methodology 
2.1.1. Evaluation pilots 
Sixteen commercial flight crews (a captain and first officer) participated in the experiment.  Each flight crew flew for 
the same company to ensure crew coordination and cohesion with regard to surface operation procedures.  The captains 
had an average of over 16,000 flight hours with 22.3 years of commercial flying and the first officers had an average of 
over 11,000 flight hours with 13.5 years of commercial flying.  Forty-four percent of subject captains required 
corrective lenses.  The subjects were given a 45-minute briefing to explain the display concepts and the evaluation 
tasks.  After the briefing, a 1-hour training session was conducted to familiarize the subjects with the RFD simulator, 
HUD, the HWD device, and the piloting task.  Only the captain had a HUD or HWD; the first officer had a head-down 
repeater display of the captain’s head-up device.  An eye dominance test was performed after the training briefing.  All 
subject captains were right eye dominant.  The HWD was viewed with the right eye.  Following training, 5 hours of data 
collection was conducted.  The total experiment time for a subject crew was approximately 8 hours. 
2.1.2. Evaluation task 
Pilots conducted taxi operations at Chicago O’Hare International Airport.  The display concept and weather were 
varied.  A total of 27 different taxi scenarios were used in the study.  All taxiing tasks involved exiting the runway and 
taxiing to the airport movement area.  The weather state for the out-the-window scene was varied between night-time 
with unlimited visibility (visual meteorological conditions; VMC), and daytime with 700-foot runway visibility range 
(RVR).  For the final run, the visibility was reduced to 500-foot RVR.  Pilots were instructed to taxi at a speed they 
thought appropriate for the task and to avoid other aircraft.  The subject crews were briefed to follow their company 
guidelines as far as taxi speeds and procedures.  Further, crews were instructed that the safety of the aircraft should 
never be compromised. 
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Before each data trial, the flight crews were briefed on their current location and expected turnoff.  Each trial began 
with an initial speed of 10 knots followed by an immediate call from the tower controller.  Once cleared of the runway, 
the first officer switched to ground frequency and called the ground controller for clearance.  The ground controller 
provided the ground clearance along with a data linked message of the route.  During the data run, automated air traffic 
control (ATC) communications were played to simulate typical radio party line chatter.  In addition, other pre-recorded 
aircraft traffic taxied around the surface.  Crews were instructed that the traffic was pre-recorded; therefore, they should 
give way to all traffic.  Further, they were briefed that the ground controller would not provide traffic awareness cues. 
2.1.3. Display concepts 
Four different display concepts were used (Fig. 2): 
1) A head-down electronic moving map (EMM) without routing or traffic information. There was no head-up 
display with this concept (Baseline), 
2) A HWD concept with a head tracker that displayed a virtual airport environment but no traffic, routing or 
clearance information with the baseline EMM head-down display (Intermediate HWD),  
3) A HUD concept with an advanced EMM head-down display.  The scene-linked HUD symbology consisted 
of 3-dimensional depiction of the cleared route by highlighting the taxiway edge lines and centerlines.  The 
advanced EMM contained iconic traffic, clearance and routing information (Advanced HUD) and  
4) An advanced HWD concept with virtual traffic and routing information and an advanced EMM head-down 
display (Advanced HWD).   
All display concepts had a head-down EMM display.  The EMM consisted of a perspective, track-up view of the airport 
showing an ownship symbol, ground speed, heading, surface movement areas, centerlines, airport surface labels, and 
current range selection.  Both the captain and first officer had an EMM display with independent range controls, which 
consisted of 4 zoom levels.  The EMM replaced the navigation display (ND).  In addition to the perspective track-up 
mode, the pilot could select a north-up mode that showed the entire airport view from directly above. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The four display concepts: Baseline, Intermediate HWD, Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD. 
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Two EMM display concepts were used:  1) a baseline EMM that contained an ownship symbol, ground speed, heading, 
taxiways with centerlines and labels and runways, and 2) an advanced EMM.  The advanced EMM contained the same 
information as the baseline EMM with the addition of a route display, clearance information, distance to the next 
taxiway, and traffic icons.  For the advanced display concepts (Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD), symbology was 
displayed on the EMM that depicted the field-of-view of the head-up device.  On the advanced EMM shown in Fig. 2, 
the field-of-view symbology is shown as green wedge-shaped lines on the ownship symbol.  For the HUD, the angle of 
the wedge symbology was 30 degrees, as this is the horizontal field-of-view of the HUD.  For the HWD concepts, 
wedge symbology was 22 degrees.  Also, this field-of-view symbology moved as the captain moved his/her head; thus, 
the portion of the virtual airport the captain was viewing could be correlated on the EMM.  Hold short symbology was a 
typical roadside stop sign. 
 
The intermediate display concept consisted of the baseline EMM head-down display and the HWD with head tracker.  
The HWD was a virtual airport view from the pilot’s eye perspective.  The virtual world was aligned manually by the 
captain by slightly tilting his/her head down making the out-the-window view and virtual airport view conformal, thus 
the actual taxiways overlaid the virtual taxiways.  The virtual airport consisted of the ORD airport, buildings, surface 
movement areas and centerlines.  Taxi signage was displayed in the HWD.  This signage was modeled to appear to be 
actual airport surface signage; however, the HWD signage was placed on the side of an upcoming turn and did not 
necessarily correlate with the actual out-the-window sign placement.  The HWD displayed the ground speed, heading 
and an aircraft-heading pointer.  The aircraft-heading pointer was used to aid the pilot in determining the aircraft 
heading during head movement. 
 
The Advanced HUD display concept was based on RIPS2 and T-NASA3 concepts (Fig. 3).  The head-up display showed 
current ground speed in digital format, the current taxiway (shown as M6 in Fig. 3), next cleared taxiway (shown as M 
in upper right of Fig. 3), centerline markers and virtual cones on the taxiway edge.  Additional cues were given for 
turns.  These cues consisted of turn flags and virtual turn signs (similar to roadway turn signs)7.  Runway holding 
positions were displayed as a single solid line at the hold short locations.  Also, a virtual stop sign was placed in the 
middle of the hold short line.  A non conformal taxi director display provided an intuitive display of the relationship 
between the taxiway centerline and the aircraft’s landing gear.  The captain could remove all the symbols from the HUD 
display by pressing the auto throttle disconnect button.  The auto throttle disconnect button was used for declutter 
because it was conveniently located and auto throttles were not used in the experiment.  A second press of the auto 
throttle disconnect would restore all of the HUD symbology.  The captain also had control of the brightness level of the 
HUD. 
 
Figure 3.  HUD showing centerline and edge line cones of the cleared route.  Bottom box shows the taxi director non -
conformal display. 
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The Advanced HWD concept contained all of the information in the Intermediate HWD concept with addition of traffic 
and routing information.  The Advanced HWD employed a 3-dimensional generic aircraft model to depict traffic, the 
cleared route was shown as a magenta overlay on the taxiway centerline, text was displayed for the cleared route and for 
the distance to the next taxiway, and virtual taxiway edge cones depicted the edge lines of the cleared route.  Like the 
HUD, virtual turn signs were used as an additional turn cue and hold short cues were denoted by virtual stop signs.  
Similar to the HUD, a non-conformal insert depicted a plan view of the runway, together with the airplane outline and 
location of the gear (Fig. 4).  The pilot could remove this non-conformal display by pressing the auto-throttle disconnect 
button.  A second press of the auto-throttle disconnect button would remove all symbology in the HWD.  A third press 
would bring all symbology back to the HWD.  Also, the captain could control the brightness of the display via a rotary 
knob. 
 
 
Figure 4.  The non-conformal insert display.  Shown in the insert are the ownship outline, main gear, nose gear and route. 
2.2. Experiment One results 
2.2.1. Quantitative data 
2.2.1.1. Taxi Performance 
A Multi-Variate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) Will’s Lambda test revealed a significant main effect for display 
concept, F (9,585) = 4.755, p < 0.0001; and visibility condition, F(9, 240) = 6.221, p < 0.0001.  For display condition, 
subsequent tests of general linear model univariate effects showed significant effects for taxi speed F(3,242) = 6.253, p 
< 0.01; and RMS path error F(3,242) = 5.128, p< 0.01.  No significant effects were found for time to taxi, p > 0.05.  For 
RMS path error, post-hoc Student Newman-Keuls test reported two unique subsets: (1) Advanced HUD and Advanced 
HWD produced significantly lower RMS path error than both Baseline and Intermediate HWD, but they were not 
statistically significant from each other; and (2) no significant differences between Intermediate HWD and Baseline 
condition (Fig. 5).  For taxi speed,  three overlapping subsets were found, in order of reduced mean taxi speed: (1) 
Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD; (2) Advanced HWD and Intermediate HWD, and (3) baseline and Intermediate 
HWD (Fig. 5). 
 
For visibility, the ANOVA found a significant effect for time to taxi, F(1.242) = 4.452, p<0.01; and taxi speed, F(1,242) 
= 10.518, p < 0.01.  No significant effects were found for RMS path error, p< 0.05.  Flight crews taxied significantly 
faster (15 kts vs. 13 kts) and took less time to taxi (219 sec vs. 233 sec) to the airport movement area during the 700 
RVR visibility than the night VMC condition, respectively.  The interaction between display condition and visibility 
condition was not significant, p > 0.05.   
2.2.1.2. Navigational errors 
Navigational errors were divided into 2 categories: major and minor5.  A major navigation error is defined as a loss of 
navigational awareness, which resulted in a wrong turn or a failure to turn.  A minor navigation error is defined as 
failure to remain on route but was immediately noticed and corrected by the crew.  A navigation error, which involved 
an incursion with other aircraft, was accounted for in a different measure and not included as a navigational error.  A 
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total of 34 navigational errors were made, where 22 were classified as major errors and 12 were classified as minor.  All 
of the major errors occurred with the Baseline and Intermediate HWD concept. Figure 6 shows the navigational errors 
made per display concept and weather event (night VMC or day 700 RVR). 
2.2.1.3. Taxi incursions 
A taxiway incursion event was defined as a collision with another aircraft or making a turn in front of another aircraft 
and creating a close call.  A total of 18 incursion events occurred with a third of those events occurring with the HUD 
concept (Fig. 6). 
2.2.1.4. Rare events 
Of the 27 different runs that each flight crew experienced, three data runs were rare-event scenarios.  These rare-event 
scenarios occurred in the data trials based on the severity of the rare-event.  High severity rare-events occurred late in 
the data trials as to not confound other experimental runs8.  All 16 subject crews experienced each of the 3 rare events 
only once.   
 
The first rare event represented an ATC error in which the controller verbally instructed the pilots to turn right even 
though the ground controller’s up-linked route depicted a left turn.  The results from this trial showed that all crews that 
did not have a route displayed, either on the EMM or HWD device, turned the wrong way on the intended route.  Crews 
with the displayed route immediately called ground and asked for clarification before making the turn. 
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Figure 5.  RMS Path Error and Taxi Speed for Display Condition 
 
The second rare event had traffic that was not broadcasting its position, thus, the non-transponding traffic did not appear 
on the head-down EMM or the advanced HWD.  The non-transponding aircraft did not cause an incursion event but was 
obvious enough to be easily detected in the out-the-window scene.  Neither the Baseline concept nor the Intermediate 
HWD concept was included as a display condition for this rare event because traffic is not displayed on these concepts.  
All crews noticed the traffic out-the-window and 9 of the 16 crews noticed the traffic was not displayed head-down.  
The remaining 7 crews did not notice that the traffic was not displayed on the EMM or the advanced HWD. 
 
The final rare event and final run of the day created a potential nose-to-nose traffic incursion.  The nose-to-nose rare 
event was designed to provide insight into traffic awareness between the different display concepts.  A common 
occurrence at ORD is when the terminal area is congested, aircraft may be given a “double back” clearance to create 
spacing and clear other taxiways.  This event did not create a collision scenario but instead represented a more likely 
and common situation where two aircraft were “stuck” which would require an aircraft tug to separate the two airplanes.  
A nose-to-nose situation can significantly reduce airport efficiency to resolve the incursion (FAA Class D level 
incursion).  For this rare event, crews were given a ground controller instruction for them to turn onto a taxiway that 
was occupied by another aircraft (a small commuter jet).  The visibility was reduced to 500 foot RVR for this scenario 
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so that the traffic was difficult to see, but detectable out-the-window.  The incurring aircraft was on the left (captain’s) 
side.  The scenario also had 2 aircraft on the first officer’s side.  To further increase the workload of the first officer, a 
complex ground clearance was given close to the incursion point.  Therefore, the prevention of the nose-to-nose 
situation depended mostly on the captain’s awareness.  
 
The rare event display condition was evenly distributed between each of the 4 display concepts; therefore each of the 4 
display concepts had 4 rare event data points.  For display concepts that did not have path or traffic information 
(Baseline and Intermediate HWD), 7 of the 8 crews were not able to avoid a nose-to-nose condition.  One of these flight 
crews was able to turn out of the nose-to-nose as they noticed the traffic before fully committing to the turn.  For the 
display concepts that had iconic traffic display (Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD), all but 2 crews were able to 
avoid the nose-to-nose situation.  Both nose-to-nose conditions occurred with the Advanced HWD concept.  Exit 
interviews with these flight crews revealed that the traffic represented on the HWD was not discernable because the 
aircraft was colored brown to conform with TCAS color symbology convention.  One reason for conducting Experiment 
Two (discussed below) was to identify the significance of this limitation.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Navigational and incursion errors per display concept and weather event. 
2.2.2. Qualitative data 
Several questionnaires were given at the end of each data run.  At the end of the day, paired-comparison questionnaires 
were given to both the captain and first officer. 
2.2.2.1. Post-run 
2.2.2.1.1. NASA TLX 
An ANOVA was performed for the dependent variable of task load index (mental workload) from flight crew ratings on 
the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) scale9.  No significant differences were found, p < 0.05. 
2.2.2.1.2. SART 
An ANOVA was performed for the dependent variable of situation awareness derived from flight crew ratings on the 
Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART)10.  SA = Understanding – (Demand – Supply).  Analysis found a 
significant effect for display condition, F(3, 15) = 4.16, p < 0.05.  A Student Newman-Keuls test revealed two unique 
subsets: (1) Advanced HWD (133.04) and Advanced HUD (130.23) – highest SA; and, (2) Baseline (104.07) and 
Intermediate HWD (112.30) – lowest SA.  The SA provided by the Advanced HWD and Advanced HUD was not 
significantly different from each other nor were the Baseline and Intermediate HWD significantly different from each 
other. 
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2.2.2.1.3. Taxi situational awareness questions 
Flight crews were administered a Likert post-run experimental questionnaire (1 to 5 scale; 1 = “not at all”; 5 = “very 
much”) to rate the display conditions contribution to taxi efficiency, overall navigation awareness, route awareness of 
local controller clearance, route awareness of ground controller clearance, surface traffic awareness, directional 
awareness, and taxi safety.   An ANOVA revealed significant effects for all dependent variables, p < 0.05.  Post-hoc 
Student Newman-Keuls tests were performed on these dependent variables resulting in two unique subsets: (1) no 
significant differences between Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD, and (2) no significant differences between 
Intermediate HWD and Baseline.  Means for each dependent variable are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Means for Post-Run Questionnaire By Display Condition 
 
 Taxi Efficiency 
Navigation 
Awareness 
Route 
Awareness 
(local) 
Route 
Awareness 
(Ground) 
Traffic 
Awareness 
Direction 
Awareness Taxi Safety 
Baseline 
 3.56 3.62 3.62 3.47 2.62 3.17 3.49 
Intermediate 
HWD 3.63 3.67 3.72 3.59 2.81 3.26 3.58 
Advanced 
HWD 4.49 4.46 4.35 4.42 3.9 3.76 4.42 
Advanced 
HUD 4.56 4.48 4.37 4.43 4.04 3.82 4.44 
 
2.2.2.1.4. Simulation sickness questionnaire 
HWDs have been found to induce symptoms of motion or simulator sickness.  The potential causes are many11.  The 
occurrence of simulator sickness in operation or training with HWDs for commercial aviation applications would be 
problematic and detrimental to the commercial applications of HWDs if this were the case12.  At the end of each run, 
pilots were given a questionnaire to determine simulation sickness13.  Crews were also given a baseline and an end-of-
the-day questionnaire.  Detailed results are discussed in SPIE Defense and Security Symposium paper 6557-31 by 
Bailey, et al in the Head- /Helmet-Mounted Displays XII conference, April 2007. 
2.2.2.2. Post-test 
2.2.2.2.1. Paired comparisons 
A MANOVA statistical procedure was performed on four paired comparison scales administered to the captain and first 
officer of each flight crew; however, for brevity, only the captain’s results are reported in this paper.  The paired 
comparison scales asked the pilot to factorial evaluate each of the four display concept in comparison to one another on 
four constructs: Situation Awareness (SA-SWORD)14, Mental Workload (SWORD), Taxi Efficiency, and Taxi Safety.   
The analyses were conducted separately for captain and first officer responses.  Significant results reported are at the p 
<0.01 significance level. 
 
There was a significant main effect found for situation awareness, F(3,45) = 54.49.  A post-hoc test revealed (a) the 
moving map display to be significantly lower in situation awareness than the other three display concepts; (b) the 
Intermediate HWD to be significantly lower in situation awareness than the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD; and 
(c) no significant differences between the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD concepts. 
 
There was a significant main effect found for mental workload, F(3,45) = 5.28  A post-hoc test revealed (a) the 
Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD to be significantly lower in Mental Workload than both the Intermediate HWD 
and moving map display which (b) were not significantly different from each other and (c) no significant differences 
between the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD concepts. 
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There was a significant main effect found for taxi efficiency, F(3,45) = 23.655.  A post-hoc test revealed (a) the 
Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD to be significantly better for taxi efficiency than both the Intermediate HWD and 
moving map display which (b) were not significantly different from each other and (c) no significant differences 
between the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD concepts. 
 
There was a significant main effect found for taxi safety, F(3,45) = 23.859.  Post-hoc tests revealed (a) the Advanced 
HUD and Advanced HWD to be significantly higher in reported surface operations and taxiing safety than both the 
Intermediate HWD and moving map display which (b) were not significantly different from each other, and (c) no 
significant differences between the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD concepts. 
2.3. Discussion of Experiment One results 
Crews were asked to perform fairly complex taxi maneuvers for various display and weather conditions.  From Figure 6, 
it can be seen that the best navigational performance was with the Advanced HUD display concept regardless of the 
weather condition.  The Advanced HWD display concept had 6 minor navigational errors, where the crew knew 
immediately that they made a mistake and informed the ground controller and requested instructions.  However, for the 
Baseline and Intermediate HWD concepts, the crew didn’t realize a mistake had been made.  The crews continued on 
the wrong course unaware they were no longer on the cleared path.  With the exception of the SA paired comparison 
result, there were no significant differences between the Baseline EMM and Intermediate HWD concepts.  Pilots 
commented that the Intermediate HWD concept presented the taxi signage in head-up and familiar format. 
 
When looking at the number of taxi incursion events, the greatest number occurred with the Advanced HUD concept 
while the least occurred with the Advanced HWD concept.  The data implies that the Advanced HUD provides the best 
tactical information but fails to impart a strategic awareness.  This result has been attributed in previous work to 
possible HUD cognitive capture and was observed at NASA Ames Research Center15.  In contrast, the advanced HWD 
concept had the fewest number of taxi incursions.   
 
For the nose-to-nose rare event scenario, all but 2 of the crews who had traffic displayed were able to avoid the nose-to-
nose situation.  The rare event showed that having traffic displayed was a significant enhancement to the crew’s 
situational awareness.  Crews that avoided the nose-to-nose were able to notify ground of the traffic on their cleared 
path and ask for new instructions.  The two crews that did not notice the traffic stated that the color of the traffic symbol 
made it difficult to see the traffic icon especially at large range scales.  They also said it was hard to remember which 
scenarios had displayed traffic.  Half of the data runs did not display traffic (Baseline and Intermediate HWD) and these 
runs were randomly assigned in the run sequence.  Therefore, a follow-on second experiment was designed that 
addressed the readability/discernability of traffic.  
3. EXPERIMENT TWO:  TAXI OPERATIONS WITH ADVANCED DISPLAYS, PHASE II 
From the rare event results of Experiment One, the traffic icons were found to be difficult to distinguish, particularly on 
the head-down display.  In Experiment One, a brown color was used for traffic icons to conform with TCAS color-
coding standards for ground traffic.  For Experiment Two, a cyan color was used to increase visibility.  Further, the 
traffic icon sizes were scaled as a function of the range scale.  The combination of these changes greatly increased 
traffic awareness in preliminary testing.  In addition, the taxi director insert display on the advanced HWD concept was 
modified to improve readability and computational frame rates. 
3.1. Methodology 
3.1.1. Evaluation pilots 
Twelve commercial flight crews (a captain and first officer) participated in the experiment.  The 12 subjects for 
Experiment Two did not include anyone who had participated in Experiment One.  Each flight crew flew for the same 
company to ensure crew coordination and cohesion with regard to surface operation procedures.  The captains had an 
average of over 15000 flight hours with 29 years total flight time and the first officers had an average of over 9000 
flight hours with an average of 26 years total flight time.  Two-thirds of the captains required corrective lenses.  The 
subjects were given a 45-minute briefing to explain the display concepts and the evaluation tasks.  After the briefing, a 
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45-minute training session was conducted to familiarize the subjects with the RFD simulator, the HUD, the HWD 
device, and the piloting task.  Only the captain had a head-up display; the first officer had a head-down repeater display 
of the captain’s head-up device.  An eye dominance test was performed after the training briefing.  Of the 12 subject 
captains, 11 were right eye dominant.  The HWD was viewed with the right eye for all subjects.  The HWD is 
compatible with eyeglasses.  Following training, 2.5 hours of data collection was conducted.  Twelve of the 24 
scenarios from Experiment One were replaced with very short taxi routes, thus allowing for shorter data collection time.  
The total experiment time for each subject crew was approximately 4 hours. 
3.1.2. Evaluation task 
The evaluation task for Experiment Two was the same as Experiment One with the following exceptions:  1) A total of 
25 different taxi scenarios were used in the study.  2) There was only one rare event scenario, the nose-to-nose scenario 
from Experiment One.   
3.1.3. Display concepts 
The display concepts (Fig. 7) for Experiment Two were the same as Experiment One with the following exceptions:     
1) the Baseline display concept was replaced with a paper chart and existing cockpit displays, and 2) the Intermediate 
HWD concept was replaced with an Advanced EMM display (i.e., the Advanced EMM included iconic traffic, 
clearance information and the cleared route).  There was no head-up display with either the Advanced EMM concept or 
the Paper Chart concept. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Four display concepts for Experiment Two:  Paper Chart, Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD. 
 
The traffic icons on the Advanced EMM and the Advanced HWD were modified to improve readability (Figs. 8 & 9).  
The color was changed from brown to cyan.  For the Advanced EMM, the traffic chevrons were scaled in size as a 
function of the range scale.  As the range scale increased (zoomed out), the traffic chevron was increased in size to 
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improve readability.  Also, for the Advanced HWD, directional and strobe lights were added to the 3-dimensional traffic 
models. 
 
Figure 8.  The Advanced EMM with traffic icons (blue chevrons), routing and clearance text. 
 
In addition, the taxi director insert display on the Advanced HWD was modified to improve readability and frame 
computation speed.  In Experiment One, the airport database was rendered in the insert window.  For Experiment Two, 
the airport model was replaced with simple model of the runway and taxiway outlines.  The result was a greatly 
simplified airport database, which improved rendering speed as well as readability by providing only essential 
information.  The gain in computational speed allowed the virtual scene to be rendered within a 60 Hz frame.  
Additionally, the simplified airport database had greater contrast between the cleared route and the background, thus 
readability was improved in preliminary testing. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Advanced HWD in Experiment Two showing cyan traffic model and improved insert display.  The higher contrast 
of the insert improved readability. 
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3.2. Experiment Two results 
3.2.1. Quantitative data 
A Multi-Variate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) Will’s Lambda test revealed a significant main effect for display 
concept, F (9,585) = 3.797, p < 0.0001; and visibility condition, F(9, 240) = 5.170, p < 0.0001.  For display condition, 
subsequent tests of general linear model univariate effects showed significant effects for taxi speed F(3,234) = 3.389, p 
< 0.05; and RMS path error F(3,234) = 8.063, p< 0.01.  No significant effects were found for time to taxi, p > 0.05.   
 
For both RMS path error and taxi speed, post-hoc Student Newman-Keuls test reported two unique subsets: (1) 
Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, and Advanced HWD (no significant differences between) which produced 
significantly lower RMS path error than the Baseline Paper condition; and (2) Baseline Paper (Fig. 10).   
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Figure 10.  Taxi Speed and RMS Path Error per Display Condition for Experiment Two. 
3.2.1.1. Navigational errors 
As in Experiment One, navigational errors were divided into 2 categories: major and minor.  Also as with Experiment 
One, a navigation error, which involved an incursion with other aircraft, was accounted for in a different measure and 
not included as a navigational error.  A total of 14 navigational errors were made, where 7 were classified as major 
errors and 7 were classified as minor.  Most of the major errors occurred with the Baseline Paper Chart concept.  Figure 
11 shows the navigational errors made per display concept and weather event (night VMC or day 700 RVR). 
3.2.1.2. Taxi incursions 
A taxiway incursion event was defined as a collision with another aircraft or making a turn in front of another aircraft 
and creating a close call.  A total of 2 incursion events occurred one with the Advanced EMM concept and one with the 
Advanced HUD concept. 
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Figure 11: Navigational errors for Experiment Two. 
3.2.1.3. Rare event  
Experiment Two had one rare event scenario.  The rare event was the final run of the day and created a nose-to-nose 
traffic incursion and was the same nose-to-nose scenario used in Experiment One.  No subjects from Experiment One 
were used, thus subjects in Experiment Two were unaware of the scenario.  Again, this event did not create a collision 
scenario but instead represented a more likely and common situation where two aircraft were nose-to-nose.  Crews were 
given a ground controller instruction for them to turn onto a taxiway that was occupied by another aircraft (a small 
commuter jet).  The visibility was reduced to 500 foot RVR for this scenario so that the traffic was difficult to see, but 
detectable, out-the-window.   
 
The rare event display condition was evenly distributed between each of the 4 display concepts; therefore each of the 4 
display concepts had 3 rare event data points.  For the Baseline Paper Chart display concept, which did not have path or 
traffic information, all 3 crews got into a nose-to-nose condition.  For the display concepts that had iconic traffic display 
(Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD), all crews were able to avoid the nose-to-nose situation. 
3.2.2. Qualitative data 
3.2.2.1. Post-run 
3.2.2.1.1. NASA TLX 
An ANOVA was performed for the dependent variable mental workload (task load index) from flight crew ratings on 
the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) scale.  No significant differences were found, p > 0.05. 
3.2.2.1.2. SART 
An ANOVA was performed for the dependent variable situation awareness derived from flight crew ratings on the 
Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART).  SA = Understanding – (Demand – Supply).  Analysis found a 
significant effect for display condition, F(3, 15) = 3.77, p < 0.05.  A Student Newman-Keuls test revealed two unique 
subsets: (1) Advanced HWD (135.25), Advanced HUD (142.16), or Advanced EMM (142.38) (no significant 
differences between) – Highest SA and (2) Baseline Paper condition (82.) – Lowest SA.    
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3.2.2.1.3. Taxi situational awareness questions 
Flight crews were administered a Likert post-run experimental questionnaire (1 to 5 scale; 1 = “not at all”; 5 = “very 
much”) after each run which asked the pilots to rate the display conditions contribution to taxi efficiency, overall 
navigation awareness, route awareness of local controller clearance, route awareness of ground controller clearance, 
surface traffic awareness, directional awareness, and taxi safety.  An ANOVA revealed significant effects for all 
dependent variables, p < 0.05.  Post-hoc Student Newman-Keuls tests were performed on these dependent variables 
resulting in two unique subsets: (1) no significant differences between Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, and Advanced 
HWD, and (2) Baseline Paper condition.  Only flight crew ratings of display contribution to taxi efficiency were found 
not to be significant.  Means for each dependent variable are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Means for Post-Run Questionnaire by Display Condition. 
 
 Taxi Efficiency 
Navigation 
Awareness 
Route 
Awareness 
(local) 
Route 
Awareness 
(Ground) 
Traffic 
Awareness 
Direction 
Awareness Taxi Safety 
Paper 
 3.73 2.77 2.90 2.68 2.24 2.65 2.7 
Intermediate 
HWD 4.79 4.76 4.65 4.76 4.46 4.58 4.77 
Advanced 
HWD 4.76 4.76 4.70 4.73 4.61 4.57 4.70 
Advanced 
HUD 4.79 4.8 4.71 4.74 4.5 4.49 4.74 
 
3.2.2.2. Post test 
3.2.2.2.1. Paired comparisons 
A MANOVA statistical procedure was performed on four paired comparison scales administered to the captain and first 
officer of each flight crew; however, for brevity, only the captain’s results are reported in this paper.  The paired 
comparison scales asked the pilot to factorially evaluate each of the four display concept in comparison to one another 
on four constructs: Situation Awareness (SA-SWORD), Mental Workload (SWORD), Taxi Efficiency, and Taxi Safety.   
The analyses were conducted separately for captain and first officer responses.  Significant results reported are at the p 
<0.01 significance level. 
 
There was a significant main effect found for situation awareness, F(3,30) = 17.37.  A post-hoc test revealed that (a) 
Paper was rated significantly lower for situation awareness than the other three display concepts; (b) the Advanced 
EMM was rated significantly lower for Advanced HWD but not significantly different from Advanced HUD; and (c) no 
significant differences were found between the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD concepts. 
 
There was a significant main effect found for mental workload, F(3,30) = 366.69.  A post-hoc test revealed that Paper 
was rated significantly lower for mental workload than the other three display concepts.  No other effects were found to 
be significant for mental workload. 
 
There was a significant main effect found for taxi efficiency, F(3,30) = 25.76.  A post-hoc test revealed that (a) Paper 
was rated significantly lower for taxi efficiency than the other three display concepts; (b) the Advanced EMM was rated 
significantly lower for taxi efficiency than both the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD; and (c) no significant 
differences between the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD concepts. 
 
There was a significant main effect found for taxi safety, F(3,30) = 4.9.  However, subsequent post-hoc pair-wise 
comparison (Bonferroni) failed to find any mean difference significant at the specified alpha level. 
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3.2.2.2.2. HWD usability and simulator sickness 
HWD specific issues of usability and simulator sickness were evaluated using post-test subjective questionnaires.  
These data are presented in SPIE Defense and Security Symposium paper 6557-31 by Bailey, et al in the Head- 
/Helmet-Mounted Displays XII conference, April 2007. 
3.3. Discussion of Experiment Two results 
Experiment Two was designed to be a follow-on to Experiment One to fix the color of the displayed traffic and to 
evaluate additional display concepts to the baseline condition of airport paper map in order to fully complete the matrix 
of possible display comparisons.  From Experiment One, even though traffic was displayed, some crews missed the 
displayed traffic and ended up in a “nose-to-nose” situation for the rare event scenario.  For Experiment Two, none of 
the crews who had traffic displayed got into a nose-to-nose situation and, therefore, it appears likely that the color and 
size of the traffic icon was the main factor for the differing results from Experiment One. 
 
The performance data showed that all of the advanced concepts provided better route accuracy and faster taxi speeds 
compared to paper charts alone.  Though not significant, on average, pilots were able to complete the taxi route 15% 
faster with the advanced concepts compared to Paper.  Previous T-NASA research reported taxi speed increases in the 
range of 16% to 26%7. 
 
One surprising result was that there were 2 taxiway incursion events in Experiment Two.  These events occurred with 
the Advanced EMM and Advanced HUD conditions, respectively.  Each of these events occurred despite the traffic 
being clearly represented on the head-down moving map display (Advanced EMM).  These “near misses” were avoided 
through traffic detection made out-the-window.  No such taxiway conflict events occurred with paper or the Advanced 
HWD conditions.   
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
4.1. Quantitative results 
The results with the Advanced HUD shown in this paper are similar to the results from previous surface operations 
research conducted by NASA Ames and NASA Langley.  The performance data showed no significant differences 
between the Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, and Advanced HWD display concepts for the dependent variables 
measured, but pilots taxied significantly faster and more accurately with these displays than when taxiing with just 
paper charts alone.  In general, the advanced display concepts provided information (e.g., cleared route, ownship 
position, taxi guidance cues) enabling fast and efficient taxi.  However, no quantitative performance differences were 
found in this study differentiating head-up versus head-down display concepts (i.e., when displaying the same or similar 
information).  Additionally, the crews made significantly more navigation errors with the paper charts than with any of 
the other three advanced display concepts.   
4.2. Qualitative results 
The results of the paired comparisons showed that the addition of a head-up or head-worn display subjectively increased 
taxi efficiency compared to just having an advanced EMM alone.  These results agree with past research conducted at 
NASA Ames Research Center demonstrating that the combination of head-up display and head-down display taxi 
concepts provides superior taxi performance.   
 
From Experiment One, the 2-D head-down Baseline EMM and the 3-D head-up Intermediate HWD concepts displayed 
the same information but at different virtual camera perspectives.  From the results, there were no significant differences 
between these two concepts except the Intermediate HWD was rated higher in SA than the Baseline EMM.  Pilots 
commented that the Intermediate HWD presented the taxi signage in format that they were already familiar thus it was 
easy to interpret.   
 
The NASA TLX results showed no significant differences for mental workload suggesting that the Advanced HWD 
display does not increase, nor reduce, mental workload demands compared to current navigation methods (i.e., using 
paper charts).  Moreover, there were no differences found between the advanced display concepts further lending 
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evidence that the introduction of an Advanced HWD concept would not increase cognitive and attentional demands for 
the flight crew.   
 
The mental workload results are mirrored by the situation awareness post-run questionnaire and taxi situation awareness 
paired comparison results that also failed to show significant differences in perceived situation awareness between the 
advanced display concepts.  These three display concepts were all rated significantly higher for situation awareness than 
taxiing with paper charts alone.  When the subject captains were asked to rate their overall impressions of situation 
awareness, however, the SA-SWORD results did reveal that both the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD provided 
significantly higher SA than the Advanced EMM concept.  No significant differences were found for all ratings for all 
constructs between Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD suggesting that these two display concepts provide for equal 
amounts of perceived situation awareness, mental workload, taxi efficiency, and taxi safety.   
4.3. Taxiway conflicts 
There were fewer taxiway incursion events with the HWD than any other concept.  Since all the relevant HUD 
information is contained in a 30o H x 24o V display, pilots had their eyes out-the-window but may have been captured 
by the display symbology.  This cognitive capture effect was much less evident with the HWD because the path came 
into view as the pilots choose to see it.  Therefore, the pilot, when moving his/her head to scan for traffic, still has 
relevant navigation information in view.  Consequently, the Advanced HUD concept had significantly more taxiway 
incursions than the Advanced HWD concept.  
4.4. Rare event results 
The rare event provided another measure of situational awareness for unexpected events.  The experiments were 
designed to create mild fatigue by the final run to create line operation conditions that increase the likelihood of runway 
incursion situations.  For the ATC error in which the controller gives a verbal instruction to turn the wrong way, it was 
clear that crews with a displayed route could detect the error before making the wrong turn.  All crews that did not have 
a displayed route (i.e., Baseline EMM and Intermediate HWD) for this rare event made the wrong turn and did not 
realize the mistake until cross referencing with paper charts.  Further, flight crews commented that the displayed route 
and EMM display provided significant situational awareness over paper charts.   
 
The rare event involving the non-transponding aircraft was designed to examine cognitive capture effects.  By providing 
routing, clearance information, and traffic, it was thought that such information might keep the crews head-down rather 
than eyes out.  This rare event occurred late in the trials so that the crew was familiar with the display and the 
information displayed on it.  The results showed that all crews were still mainly “eyes out” for traffic surveillance, 
which is consistent with their current training.  Most crews were able to detect that the non-transponding traffic was not 
represented on the display(s).   
 
The nose-to-nose rare event was designed to highlight traffic awareness by the crew.  From Experiment One, two crews 
with the Advanced HWD display concept did not see the incurring traffic even though it was displayed both head up 
and head down.  Both crews commented that the brown color of the displayed traffic was difficult to distinguish without 
concentrating on the displays.  They commented that it was desired that traffic be detectable with a quick glance; 
however the traffic icons should not adversely clutter the displays.  For Experiment Two, the traffic color and size was 
changed to improve readability.  Subsequently, for Experiment Two, all crews with display concepts that had traffic 
information (Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, and Advanced HWD) were able to avoid the nose-to-nose situation.  As 
with the ATC rare event, crews had information available within the cockpit that contradicted the controller’s clearance.  
In both situations, crews contacted the ground controller to resolve the discrepancy to avoid costly and potentially 
hazardous mistakes.  Further, crews commented that the information presented on the HUD provided no additional 
benefit in detecting this rare event in contrast to the information available on the HWD (e.g., traffic).  In other words, 
the Advanced HWD presented another source for displaying traffic information that supplemented information being 
presented on the Advanced EMM head-down display. 
4.5. Future research issues 
A significant body of research has shown that runway incursions can be mitigated or even prevented via flight deck 
alerting.  For the experiments presented in this paper, however, the crew’s situational awareness was the interest of 
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study; therefore, alerting was not implemented.  Alerting, in conjunction with these displays, would clearly add 
significantly to further enhancing the safety of surface operations.  In addition to incursion alerting for a data-linked 
path, alerting could also be given when an aircraft is off-route, attempting to use a closed runway or taxiway, etc.  
Alerting provides critical cues when the crew (or controller) has already lost SA in such a way that creates a safety 
hazard.  The goal of NASA HWD surface system is to enable the flight crew to be proactive and never lose surface SA.  
Future research will evaluate the additive effects of including such alerting algorithms, derived from the NASA Runway 
Incursion Prevention System research, to determine whether further safety enhancements to airport surface operations 
are possible.  
 
One issue with HWD display is alignment.  For these experiments, the HWD was aligned with the scene by displaying a 
grid pattern in the HWD and the same pattern in the out-the-window visuals.  For actual operations, the alignment 
process would need to be quick, reliable and with a pre-determined degree of integrity and assurance in the alignment.  
Further, the HWD image stability and alignment must be maintained during operation.  With a HUD, this bore-sighting 
procedure is done once and “hard-mounted” into the aircraft.  The cost savings in weight for an HWD may be out-
weighed by the cost in developing a robust procedure for HWD alignment and image correlation. 
 
For both experiments, the first officers had a repeater display of the head-up device (either the HUD or HWD).  First 
officers commented that the repeat of the HUD did not provide any significant situational awareness.  The HUD did not 
have the out-the-window image; therefore the first officer was unable to easily correlate the symbology to the scene.  
For the HWD repeater, first officers commented that the repeater was a distraction.  The HWD repeater displayed all the 
captain’s head movement, thus the image on the repeater was constantly changing.  This highly dynamic image would 
tend to unnecessarily capture the first officer’s attention.  Essentially, early in the trials, the first officers ignored the 
repeater and commented that the Advanced EMM with routing, clearance and traffic information provided the essential 
information for surface operations in these experiments. 
 
Another issue that NASA will be addressing in the future is obscuration of the outside world view by the pilot, in this 
“augmented reality” created by the HWD.  For instance, semi-conformal display concepts, binocular/monocular 
displays, and clutter countermeasures will be explored in this area. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the results provide sufficient data to warrant the conclusion that an Advanced HWD has significant advantages 
over a HUD for enhancing taxiway conflict detection.  There were a few limitations of the implementation of the HWD 
concept that may have reduced its full potential to demonstrate marked differences between the capabilities of the HUD 
and HWD concepts.  Despite this, the taxiway conflict results suggest that an Advanced EMM alone, or in combination 
with a HUD, may not be sufficient to provide a total solution to the issue of runway incursions.  With regard to all other 
results, no significant differences were found suggesting that the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD are comparable 
to each other with regard to mental workload, taxi efficiency, taxi performance, and perceived taxi safety.   
 
In addition to the efficiency and safety advantages of the advanced HWD, there are other considerations that argue for a 
HWD solution.  The HWD provides potential weight savings that would have significant cost advantages to commercial 
airlines.  Further, HUDs are designed for the flight regime, thus the 30o H by 24o V area is sufficient for flight but not 
necessarily for surface operations.  On the ground, one of the main tasks of the crew is to survey all around the aircraft 
to avoid collisions with other airplanes or objects on the airport surface.  This limitation was especially evident in the 
present experiment when the flight crew attempted turns because the path is only displayed as virtual turn flags in the 
HUD due to required over-steering. 
 
The experiments revealed numerous future directions to better optimize and develop these concepts.  One future 
direction involves the integration of enhanced vision sensor technology with the optimized HWD concept.  Further, for 
these experiments, the routing and clearance information was relayed to the aircraft displays via a simulated controller 
data-link and implementation of conflict alerting.  Currently, IIFDT/Crew-Vehicle Interface team is conducting research 
in using voice recognition technology to quickly and accurately enter routing information during read-back and possibly 
also, conducting analysis of the speech and airport information for route awareness and route / track analysis. 
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